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Abstract
While the hypothesis that ownership concentration can aect the value of a company has seen a lot
of empirical study, little light has been shed on a complementary problem, that these concentrated
owners have a cost of their position due to an undiversiﬁed portfolio. Using a unique data set of
the actual diversiﬁcation of all Norwegian equity owners, we show that the largest owners of a
corporation in fact have very undiversiﬁed equity portfolios, and that such owners have signiﬁcant
costs to their concentrated portfolios. At the level of risk of a benchmark portfolio, if they were
to move from their present portfolio composition in risky assets to a well diversiﬁed portfolio,
their returns would have increased by about 13 percentage points in annual terms. We ask whether
this cost can be explained by estimated beneﬁts of ownership concentration (private beneﬁts), and
show that extant estimates of private beneﬁts are too low to oset our cost estimates. (JEL Codes:
G10, G30.)
Key words: Portfolio diversiﬁcation, Large equity owners, Costs and beneﬁts of equity
ownership concentration, Private beneﬁts.
Introduction
Partial concentration of ownership and control in the hands of one or a few investors is one of
the ﬁve alternative control mechanisms for resolving the collective action problem at the heart of
thecorporategovernanceproblem(Becht, Bolton, andRoell,2003, pg4). Thetheoryofownership
concentration is based on a tradeo between risk diversiﬁcation, which increases when ownership
becomes more disperse, and optimal monitoring incentives, which need concentrated ownership.
Theoretical analysis (Admati, Pﬂeiderer, and Zechner, 1994; Maug, 1998) suggests that this trade-
o leads to undersupply of monitoring, due to the classical free-riding intuition: The concentrated
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ers the costs, but do not get all of the beneﬁts, since improved monitoring increases the
value of the ﬁrm to all its owners. A possible osetting eect is the potential for large owners to
collude with management to the detriment of the other shareholders.1
A huge empirical literature has analyzed aspects of this issue. The most prominent asks the
question: Does ownership concentration matter for corporate performance? The typical ﬁnding
is that ﬁrm performance varies with ownership concentration and owner type.2 Another strand
of literature has asked whether large owners have private beneﬁts of control, inferred either from
block premia (Barclay and Holderness, 1989)3 or superior voting shares (Lease, McConnell, and
Mikkelson, 1983).4
There is however very little empirical work which has looked directly at one component of
the tradeo facing an owner when he decides to become large, namely the portfolio diversiﬁcation
implications of taking a large stake. For an owner to inﬂuence a company his stake in the company
has to be large enough that his voice is heard and acted on. This imposes a cost on the owner. For
any owner with limited wealth a large stake in any one company reduces the funds available for
other equity investments. This “diversiﬁcation loss” has been used as an argument in theoretical
settings, but has seen little empirical investigation. The reason is obvious. To say something about
these issues one needs information about the wealth of a given owner and the owner’s complete
equity portfolio. To empirically describe this diversiﬁcation loss is the contribution of the present
paper.
Using an unique dataset which contains the equity holdings of all investors at the Oslo Stock
Exchange over a 14 year period, we characterize the actual portfolios of the largest owners. We
show that the largest owner in a company is very undiversiﬁed. The median such owner has an
equity portfolio containing only four stocks, with 88% of that owner’s equity wealth invested in
one company. These numbers vary by owner type. The most diversiﬁed are ﬁnancial owners
(which presumably have less of a wealth constraint), which have a median of 34 ﬁrms in their
portfolio, and 9% of their wealth invested in the ﬁrm in which they are the largest owner. On the
other hand, an individual non-corporate owner has a median of 3 ﬁrms in his portfolio and close
to 100% of his wealth invested in one company. These owners in particular are under-diversiﬁed.
These observations motivates our construction of a measure of the economic importance of
the diversiﬁcation loss suered by investors taking a large equity stake. We do this by, in a mean
variance setting, looking at how an investor could improve his portfolio tradeo by moving from
his present portfolio composition to a well diversiﬁed benchmark, such as a market portfolio,
keeping the portfolio volatility constant. Across all the owners in the sample such a move would
have increased expected returns by 13 percentage points in annual terms.
We then go on to look in more detail at the decision problem facing individual investors, and
ask whether the observed diversiﬁcation loss for the ﬁnancial part of the portfolio can be explained
1Tirole (2006) summarizes much of the theoretical literature on these issues.
2The starting points for this literature are Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) and
McConnell and Servaes (1990). Gugler (2001) summarizes much of this literature. Bøhren and Ødegaard (2006)
gives evidence on this issue using Norwegian data.
3See Dyck and Zingales (2004) for a recent example of this kind os study, and a summary of the literature.
4For a summary of the literature on superior voting shares, see the survey articles by Burkhart and Lee (2008) and
Adams and Ferreira (2008). See Ødegaard (2007b) for some evidence on superior voting shares in Norway.
2as the outcome of a rational decision by these owners, by ﬁrst showing how the ﬁnancial part of
the portfolio ﬁts into the total portfolio problem of such investors, and then using the estimates of
diversiﬁcation loss found in this paper to compare with extant estimates of beneﬁts of ownership
concentration (private beneﬁts). We ﬁnd that the literature’s estimates of private beneﬁts are an
order of magnitude lower than is necessary to oset the diversiﬁcation losses we ﬁnd. If we believe
that the concentration choices we observe in this paper are outcomes of a rational weighting of
costs and beneﬁts, this must mean that the beneﬁts of ownership concentration are much larger
than previously thought.
Due to the special nature of our data, there is very little comparable evidence in the literature.
There is some work looking at diversiﬁcation of individual investors,5 but this literature do not
speciﬁcally consider the largest owners, the owners where the wealth constraint is most likely to be
a factor. There is some related work using data from Sweden, where it is also possible to construct
the portfolios of individual owners. For example, Holmen, Knopf, and Peterson (2003, 2007)
construct the portfolios of managerial owners of Swedish ﬁrms for two years, 1988 and 1991.
They then ask whether the portfolio concentration of the owners seem important for corporate
decisions. Bodnaruk, Kandel, Massa, and Simonov (2008) uses data on owner diversiﬁcation to
look at the IPO decision. Our focus is dierent. Our long time series of data allows us to attack
the issues in a dierent way, by taking the asset pricing route.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the market and data. In sec-
tion 2 we describe the level of diversiﬁcation for the largest owners, and show how it depends on
the owner type. In section 3 we ask whether the under-diversiﬁcation is economically signiﬁcant
by estimating a diversiﬁcation loss. In section 4 we look at individual investors, and ask whether
their diversiﬁcation losses can be explained by extant estimates of the beneﬁts of ownership con-
centration, Section 5 summarizes and concludes the paper.
1. Market and Data
The ﬁrms in the sample are listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE), which is a moderately
sized exchange by international standards. In 1997, the 217 listed ﬁrms had an aggregate market
capitalization which ranked the OSE twelfth among the 21 European stock exchanges for which
comparable data is available. In terms of investor protection La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1998) puts Norway at the average of countries in the Scandinavian group. The Scan-
dinavian legal tradition is between the US and European traditions, with relatively strong investor
protection.6
This paper uses data from the Norwegian equity market for the period 1989 through 2006. We
usethreetypesofdata. OneisdataoncorporateownershipfromtheNorwegianSecuritiesRegistry
(VPS). From this source we use annual observations of the equity holdings of the complete stock
market. At each date we observe the number of stocks owned by every owner. Each owner has a
5See for example Blume and Friend (1975), Barber and Odean (2000), Goetzmann and Kumar (2005),
Polkovichenko (2002) and Kumar (2005).
6A detailed description of the Norwegian stock market and Norwegian corporate governance regulations can be
found in Bøhren and Ødegaard (2000, 2001).
3unique identiﬁer which allows us to construct the equity portfolio of that owner. Note that our data
only contains the equity part of an owner’s portfolio, we do not have data on any other investments.
For each owner the data include a sector code that allows us to distinguish between such types
as mutual fund owners, ﬁnancial owners (which include mutual funds), industrial (nonﬁnancial
corporate) owners, private (individual) owners, state owners7 and foreign owners.8
In addition to the data on equity ownership we use market data from the Oslo Stock Exchange
Data Service (OBI). This source provides stock prices and accounting data allowing the con-
struction of return series. We only include companies whose stocks satisfy a minimum level of
liquidity.9 Finally, we use interest rate data from Norges Bank, the Central Bank of Norway.
2. How well diversiﬁed are large equity owners?
We begin by describing the portfolio holdings of the largest investors in each ﬁrm. Before we
look at the portfolios of the largest owners, table 1 shows some statistics for the relative size of
these largest owners in a given company. Panel A of the table shows that the average largest owner
has an equity stake of almost 30%, while the average second largest owner has a stake just above
10%. These numbers vary across owner types. Financial and individual owners tend to have a
smaller stake than nonﬁnancial corporations and foreign owners of the same rank. Panel B of the
table shows what fractions of the owners are of a given type. Observe that the largest owner most
commonly is a nonﬁnancial corporation (about 50% of the sample). Financial owners seem to
avoid being the largest owner, they are more commonly owners of ranks 2-5.
We now turn to the actual portfolios of the largest owners, and ask how well diversiﬁed they
are. We calculate two simple measures of diversiﬁcation. The ﬁrst calculates the number of stocks
in a portfolio, which assumes that diversiﬁcation increases in the number of dierent components
in a portfolio. The second looks at the concentration of wealth in the largest stock position in a
portfolio.
2.1. How many stocks do the largest owners invest in?
We ﬁrst ask simply how many stocks an investor holds in his portfolio. For each ﬁrm and
date in the sample we ﬁnd the ﬁve largest owners. For each owner we identify the owner’s actual
portfolio of listed stocks at the Oslo Stock Exchange and count the number of listed ﬁrms in the
portfolio. Table 2 shows the results, split by the owner’s rank. We show averages calculated for
all owners, and also split by the four owner types ﬁnancial, foreign, individual and nonﬁnancial
(corporate) owners.
7In the analysis we remove state owners. The government is likely to have other agendas than private investors,
and is also less likely to care about diversiﬁcation costs and beneﬁts. We therefore leave out the cases of large state
ownership.
8We do not have detailed data on all of the foreign owner’s portfolios. Some of the foreign equity positions are
only listed indirectly, the ownership is done through nominee accounts with large international investment banks. We
do not have access to the breakdown of owners for the nominee accounts. These data are therefore left out.
9To avoid problems due to low liquidity and bid ask bounce we require the stocks used in the analysis to have
a price above NOK 10 (About USD 1.50) and have actual trades a minimum of 20 days during a year. This ﬁlter
removes an average of 32 stocks per year. For more details about asset pricing data at the Oslo Stock Exchange see
Ødegaard (2007a).
4Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the ownership stakes of the largest investors
Panel A: What fraction of a given company is owned by the largest owners?
Rank All State Financial Nonﬁnancial Foreign Individual
1 28.7 34.8 18.3 30.6 29.3 23.2
2 10.3 9.4 8.0 11.6 10.9 9.1
3 6.4 5.7 5.4 7.2 6.4 5.9
4 4.5 4.5 4.3 4.8 4.7 4.0
5 3.5 3.7 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.1
Panel B: What fraction of the sample of owners is of a given type?
Rank State Financial Nonﬁnancial Foreign Individual
1 8.5 10.8 49.6 22.5 8.7
2 7.2 18.6 39.3 24.5 10.5
3 5.4 23.2 35.3 24.4 11.6
4 4.5 26.4 31.2 24.6 13.3
5 4.2 27.2 29.1 25.4 14.1
The tables describe the ownership stakes in individual companies for all owners. We report the actual stake in one company, without controlling for
the complete portfolio of the owner. Panel A shows the fraction of a given company held by the owners of ranks 1-5. The calculation is done for
all owners (all) and splitting the owners into ﬁve groups: State, ﬁnancials, nonﬁnancial corporations, international (foreign) owners and individual
(private) owners. Panel B calculates what percentage of the sample of owners is of each of the four types. Numbers in percent. Data for companies
listed at the Oslo Stock Exchange in the period 1989 to 2006.
Table 2: The number of stocks in the equity portfolios of the largest owners
Type owner
rank All Financial Foreign Individual Nonﬁnancial
mean med n mean med n mean med n mean med n mean med n
1 17.7 4 3026 49.0 34 382 29.8 3 710 6.0 3 272 7.3 3 1662
2 27.2 11 3034 51.1 41 651 41.2 25 778 9.0 3 305 11.0 5 1300
3 29.1 13 3075 54.1 44 804 40.1 26 752 7.4 3 359 11.5 6 1160
4 32.9 18 3084 56.3 46 894 44.9 35 812 7.7 3 424 11.9 6 954
5 33.4 20 3115 55.9 46 938 43.1 28 825 11.8 5 422 12.0 6 930
The table shows descriptive statistics for the number of dierent stocks held by the ﬁrm’s largest owners. For each company we identify the ﬁve
largest owners. For each of these owners we ﬁnd the number of listed ﬁrms this owner has in his portfolio. We report averages (mean) and medians
(med) for each rank (1-5) for all owners and across the four owner types: Financials, nonﬁnancial corporations, international (foreign) owners and
individual (private) owners. The column labeled n contains the number of observations. Data for companies listed at the Oslo Stock Exchange in
the period 1989 to 2006.
5A number of interesting patterns appear in the table. First, the mean is substantially above the
median across all observations. This is due to a skewed distribution. For example, there are some
ﬁnancial investors which essentially holds all the stocks on the exchange (one portfolio contains
193 stocks!). Such numbers signiﬁcantly aect the means. In this case the median is a better
indication of the midpoint of the distribution, and we therefore concentrate on the median. Over
the period the median owner of rank 1 invests in only four stocks.
An obvious way to put this number in perspective is to refer to the classical analysis of Evans
and Archer (1968) and Wagner and Lau (1971). These authors carry out simulations which illus-
trate how increasing the number of stocks in an equally weighted portfolio lowers the standard
deviation of the portfolio. They argue that most of the diversiﬁcation beneﬁt has been reaped after
including 10-15 shares in a portfolio.10 However, these results are for equally weighted portfolios,
not portfolios with wealth concentrated in one or a few stocks. With this in mind 4 stocks seem on
the low side for a well-diversiﬁed portfolio.
The number of stocks in the portfolio increases as we move away from the largest owner. The
typical owner of rank 2 has 11 stocks in his portfolio, a number which increases to 20 stocks for the
ﬁfth largest owner. This suggests that the largest owner of a ﬁrm is particularly under-diversiﬁed,
an observation which will be conﬁrmed when we look at portfolio weights.
To see whether these patterns depend on the type of owner table 2 also splits the data by
the four owner groups. We see clear dierences between owner types, dierences which are as
expected. In terms of number of stocks in the portfolio, the most diversiﬁed are ﬁnancial and
foreign owners, the least diversiﬁed are nonﬁnancial corporate owners and in particular individual
owners. Individual owners are clearly least diversiﬁed, with a median of 3 stocks in the portfolio
of an individual owner when (s)he is largest. It is interesting to note that also when an individual
owner is not the largest, but has rank between 2 and 5, his portfolio has few stocks, ranging
between 3 and 5 stocks. This pattern is dierent from foreign and nonﬁnancials, where it is only
the case where such an owner is largest (rank 1) that the number of stocks is low. For example, for
foreign owners, when a foreign owner has rank 1 his portfolio contains a median of 3 stocks. If
instead the foreign owner is of rank 2, his portfolio has a median of 25 stocks.
To further illustrate the dierences across owner types, ﬁgure 1 shows histograms giving the
full distribution of the number of stocks in the largest owner’s equity portfolio. The dierence
between ﬁnancial owners and the other three owner types are particularly clearly seen in this
ﬁgure. It is only the ﬁnancial owners which have a substantial number of cases where portfolios
contain more than 20 stocks. For all the other owner types the leftmost bin, the one with the fewest
possible number of stocks, dominates the other bins.
While the numbers of stock in a portfolio is an obvious measure of the diversiﬁcation of the
portfolio, it is an imperfect measure since it does not control for dierences in weights across
stocks in the portfolio. If we just count stocks, a portfolio with 0.95 million invested in one
stock and 50 thousand spread across four other stocks is just as diversiﬁed as a portfolio with 200
thousand invested in each of the same ﬁve stocks. We therefore complement this diversiﬁcation
measure with one which also account for the levels of investment.
10Similar analysis for Norway in Ødegaard (2007a) shows that the same numbers are relevant for the Norwegian
market, with most of the diversiﬁcation beneﬁt achieved after including 15 stocks in the portfolio.
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Histograms of the number of stocks in an owner’s portfolio. We only use data for the largest owner in any one company. We show results for the
four owner types: Financials, nonﬁnancial corporations, international (foreign) owners and individual (private) owners. Data for companies listed
at the Oslo Stock Exchange in the period 1989 to 2006.
72.2. What fraction of their wealth do the largest owners need to use?
To calculate our second measure of diversiﬁcation we ask: For a given ﬁrm and owner, what
fraction of the owner’s equity wealth is invested in that particular stock? For the example just
mentioned, this measure would be calculated as 0.95 for the ﬁrst case and 0.2 for the second case.
Table 3 reports estimates of this diversiﬁcation measure. The numbers conﬁrm the results on the
numberofsharesintheequityportfolios. Themedianlargestownerhas88%ofhiswealthinvested
in the ﬁrm in which he is largest. Again, the numbers vary across owner type. The median largest
ﬁnancial owner only invests 9% of its portfolio wealth. In all other cases the median largest owner
invests the majority of his wealth in the ﬁrm in which he is largest. The numbers vary from 61%
for foreign and 95% for nonﬁnancial corporate to 100% for individual owners. These numbers also
make the distinction between individual owners and other owners much clearer. When individual
owners are of ranks 2-5 they still invest the majority of their wealth in one ﬁrm, moving from 98%
for rank 2 to 86% for rank 5. For all other owner types the fraction invested falls markedly once
they are not the highest ranked owner.
Table 3: The fraction of the ﬁrm’s largest owner’s wealth invested in the ﬁrm’s equity
Type owner
rank All Financial Foreign Individual Nonﬁnancial
mean med n mean med n mean med n mean med n mean med n
1 0.65 0.88 2778 0.28 0.09 353 0.55 0.61 623 0.85 1.00 255 0.74 0.95 1547
2 0.45 0.27 2773 0.13 0.03 608 0.42 0.19 689 0.78 0.98 263 0.56 0.65 1213
3 0.40 0.18 2829 0.10 0.02 750 0.36 0.12 687 0.78 0.99 314 0.53 0.47 1078
4 0.36 0.11 2833 0.07 0.02 836 0.30 0.08 731 0.74 0.94 374 0.51 0.48 892
5 0.34 0.09 2832 0.08 0.02 848 0.29 0.07 744 0.69 0.86 367 0.49 0.41 873
The table shows descriptive statistics for the fraction of an owner’s equity wealth invested in a ﬁrm. For each company we identify the owner
according to rank and type and calculate what fraction this owner’s position is of his total equity wealth. We report mean and median (med). The
column labeled n contains the number of observations. Data for companies listed at the Oslo Stock Exchange in the period 1989 to 2006.
To further investigate dierences across owner types ﬁgure 2 shows histograms of the full
distribution of the fraction of wealth invested. The individual owners have particularly wealth
concentrated portfolios. A clear majority of the nonﬁnancial (corporate) owners also have concen-
trated portfolios, but the opposite picture is true for foreign and nonﬁnancial investors.
The observations of this section are easily summarized. The largest owners of a ﬁrm have very
undiversiﬁed equity portfolios. The median largest owner has only 4 ﬁrms in his equity portfolio,
and 88% of his wealth invested in the ﬁrm in which he is largest. The diversiﬁcation increases
substantially once the owner is of lower rank than the ﬁrst, except for individual owners. The
results can be explained if owners are wealth constrained, since the wealth necessary to build
up a large stake leave less funds available for other investments for diversiﬁcation purposes. This
problem ismost acute forindividual owners, but also importantfor nonﬁnancial, corporate owners.
Financial and to some degree foreign investors appear to have less of this problem.
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Histograms of the fraction of his equity wealth the largest owner use in the stock.. For each company we identify the largest owner and calculate
what fraction this owner’s position is of his total equity wealth. We only use data for the largest owners in any one company. We use annual
observations of the fractions of portfolio wealth. We show results for the four owner types: Financials, nonﬁnancial corporations, international
(foreign) owners and individual (private) owners. Data for companies listed at the Oslo Stock Exchange in the period 1989 to 2006.
93. Diversiﬁcation losses in portfolios of ﬁnancial assets
While the portfolios of the large owners are under-diversiﬁed, this does not necessarily trans-
late into it being an economically important eect. We therefore attempt to measure the economic
importance of the under-diversiﬁcation, by constructing an economic measure of the diversiﬁca-
tion loss from being less than optimally diversiﬁed. We frame the question of measurement of
diversiﬁcation loss in a mean variance setting. The loss is found by comparing the return of a
portfolio using the investor’s actual mix of risky assets to the return of an alternative diversiﬁed
benchmark portfolio.





























The ﬁgure illustrates our method for estimation of diversiﬁcation loss. The portfolio p is the actual portfolio of an equity investor. The portfolio b
is a benchmark portfolio with associated expected returns E[˜ rb] and standard deviation (˜ rb). The line from the risk free rate rf through b is the
set of mean variance combinations achievable by combining risk free borrowing and lending at the rate rf with investment in the portfolio b. The
nonlinear curve is the set of minimum variance portfolios of risky assets. The line from the risk free rate rf through p is the set of mean variance
combinations achievable by combining risk free borrowing and lending at the rate rf with investment in the portfolio p. The portfolio p is the
portfolio with the same standard deviation as b but found by combining portfolio p with the risk free asset. The portfolio b is the portfolio with
the same standard deviation as p but with the highest achievable expected return for the same level of standard deviation.
Our measure of diversiﬁcation loss is illustrated in ﬁgure 3. Suppose an investor has an actual
portfolio p. This portfolio is to be evaluated relative to some well-diversiﬁed benchmark portfolio
b, which can be the market portfolio, but also potentially some other well-diversiﬁed portfolio.
By combining the portfolios p and b with risk free investing and borrowing, any combination
along the two lines in the ﬁgure is achievable. To frame the measurement in an economically
meaningful way we compare the returns of two portfolios, one optimally diversiﬁed (generated
by the benchmark portfolio b), and one with the same diversiﬁcation properties as the investor’s
actual portfolio, i.e. along the line generated by p. We measure the diversiﬁcation loss by the
vertical dierence in expected returns between the two portfolios. As a conservative estimate we
measure the dierence at the same level of risk as the benchmark portfolio b, the vertical dierence
between the returns on portfolios b and p in the ﬁgure. This comparison assumes that the investor
has a risk free investment together with his investment in p. Our measure of the diversiﬁcation
10loss is thus the dierence in expected returns for the two portfolios b and p,11
Diversiﬁcation loss = DL = E[˜ rb]   E[˜ rp]: (1)
To estimate this loss, note that it can also be calculated as
Diversiﬁcation loss = DL =
h
SR(˜ rb)   SR(˜ rp)
i
(˜ rb); (2)
where SR is the Sharpe Ratio. To do estimation we ﬁnd the actual portfolio of an owner at a given
date. We then estimate the Sharpe ratio of the portfolio from the monthly buy and hold returns
of this portfolio over the next four years.12 Using data from the matching time period we also
estimate the Sharpe ratio of the reference portfolio b. We then use equation (2) to estimate the
diversiﬁcation loss DL.
As was shown in the previous section, the largest owner was specially under-diversiﬁed. We
therefore do the calculation for only the largest owner. Table 4 shows estimates of the diversiﬁca-
tion loss against four dierent benchmark portfolios. The ﬁrst two benchmarks are market indices,
one value weighted (VW) and one equally weighted (EW).
Table 4: Estimates of the diversiﬁcation loss
Reference All Individual Financial Foreign Nonﬁnancial
portfolio mean n mean n mean n mean n mean n
EW 0.87 2216 0.85 200 0.80 346 0.86 420 0.89 1250
(40.6) (12.0) (19.2) (16.9) (30.0)
VW 1.08 2216 1.15 200 1.05 346 1.06 420 1.09 1250
(46.2) (16.1) (19.7) (20.7) (33.1)
EW20 0.53 2216 0.51 200 0.52 346 0.47 420 0.56 1250
(18.1) (5.4) (8.0) (8.1) (13.3)
VW20 1.58 2216 1.75 200 1.53 346 1.51 420 1.59 1250
(35.4) (12.0) (14.5) (18.3) (24.9)
For each company we ﬁnd the largest owner in the company, and calculate the actual portfolio p of a given owner at yearend. We then assume this





calculation is done for all nongovernment owners (all), individual, ﬁnancial, foreign and nonﬁnancial corporate owners. This calculation uses four
dierent benchmark portfolios: VW – a value weighted market index, EW – an equally weighted market index, EW20 – an equally weighted portfolio
of the 20 largest stocks at the OSE and VW20 – a value weighted portfolio of the 20 largest stocks. The indices are described in Ødegaard (2007a).
The numbers are monthly percentage returns. Numbers in parenthesis are t-ratios.
As was to be expected, given our earlier estimates of the concentration of the largest owner,
with an average of 65% and a median of 88% of his equity investment in one stock, we ﬁnd
11An alternative would have been to look at the dierence between the actual portfolio p and the ecient portfolio
with the same standard deviation as p, marked as the portfolio b in the ﬁgure. A problem with this is that it assumes
using risk free borrowing to lever up an investment in the benchmark portfolio b, which may not be an implementable
strategy for the investors in question. We will therefore stick to the more conservative estimate represented by p.
12While this buy and hold strategy may seem unrealistic, it tallies with evidence in Bøhren, Priestley, and Ødegaard
(2006) which shows that the average holding period for the largest owner in the same sample of ﬁrms is between three
and four years.
11economically large estimates of the diversiﬁcation loss. Using the market portfolio VW as a bench-
mark, on average for all owners, the diversiﬁcation loss DL is estimated at 1.08% per month. It is
also highly statistically signiﬁcant. Thus, if the typical investor were to divest his (undiversiﬁed)
portfolio generated by p and invest in the benchmark b, he would gain an additional expected
return of almost 13% per annum.
As was also to be expected, the diversiﬁcation loss is largest for individual owners, with an
estimated DL of 1.15% per month, which is about 13.5% in annual terms. Also as expected,
the lowest diversiﬁcation loss is for ﬁnancial owners. It is actually somewhat surprising that the
estimated diversiﬁcation loss for ﬁnancials is as high as it is, given that most ﬁnancial owners
are very diversiﬁed. However, while the ﬁnancial owners are more diversiﬁed than the others, as
shown in ﬁgure 1, there is still a distribution where some of them have a low number of stocks
in their portfolios. (A quarter of the ﬁnancial owners have portfolios with less than 14 shares.)
Therefore, even for the ﬁnancial owners, there are gains from moving from their actual portfolios
to the benchmark portfolio. There is a qualiﬁcation to be made here, though. Financial owners
(like foreign) are more likely to have stocks from other countries than Norway, data which is not
in our database. Their underdiversiﬁcation may therefore be overstated by the analysis.
The estimates of diversiﬁcation loss using the market portfolio as a benchmark are substantial.
A possible reason that the estimated diversiﬁcation loss is so large is that it compares an undi-
versiﬁed portfolio to the most fully diversiﬁed portfolio available, a market portfolio. Actually
implementing an investment in the market portfolio can be dicult and costly, although one can
use index funds or futures contracts to get a return close to the market index return. To gauge
the sensitivity of our conclusions to the use of a market portfolio as the benchmark, we also con-
sider two alternative benchmark portfolios containing the 20 largest companies on the exchange,
one equally weighted (EW20) and one value weighted (VW20). These portfolios are much closer
to being implementable alternative investments.13 Table 4 also shows the results using these port-
folios as benchmarks. In both cases the diversiﬁcation loss is signiﬁantly positive, at 0.53% and
1.58%. The variation across owner types is similar to before, the highest diversiﬁcation loss is for
individual owners, the lowest for ﬁnancial owners.
Our conclusion from these results is that the largest owners of a given ﬁrm have substantial
costs due to their lack of portfolio diversiﬁcation. Although the magnitude of the costs naturally
depend on the choice of benchmark, our results indicate that the largest owners of a corporation
could achieve a signiﬁcant return gain at no cost in standard deviation terms by moving to a more
diversiﬁed portfolio.
4. The decision problem of individual investors
We have seen that the potential gains to diversiﬁcation for large, concentrated owners seem
substantial. The obvious question then is why they do not diversify. Why keep these concentrated
stakes? In the rest of the paper we will investigate this in the context of the decision problem of
individual investors. We ask whether their observed portfolios are explainable as outcomes of a
rational decision process where the individuals balance the observed diversiﬁcation losses for their
13See Ødegaard (2007a) for deﬁnitions of these market indices.
12ﬁnancial portfolio with beneﬁts of concentration. The typical term for these beneﬁts are private
beneﬁts.
We will proceed in the following manner. First we adjust the calculations in the previous
section for the fact that these are only for the ﬁnancial part of an owner’s portfolio. The decision
problem for an individual is necessarily based on this individuals total portfolio. It is in this context
we have to compare the estimated diversiﬁcation losses to potential beneﬁts. We therefore trans-
form our estimates for diversiﬁcation losses of the ﬁnancial part of the portfolio into corresponding
estimates for the total portfolio. Unfortunately some of the components of the total portfolio are
not observable. We therefore parametrize these components, and show eects on the total portfo-
lio as we change them. After getting some handle on the structure of the total diversiﬁcation loss
we can ask whether it can be explained by estimates of private beneﬁts in the literature.
4.1. Total portfolio view
We looked at the diversiﬁcation loss of the ﬁnancial portfolios of investors of dierent types.
Let us concentrate on private, individual owners, for whom we have a better understanding of
what is involved in their decision problem, to try to get at the economically interesting issue in this
paper, how does the diversiﬁcation loss enter into the decision to become a concentrated owner?
For a private individual we can split income into ﬁnancial income, and income from other sources,
such as labour. If we stay in the mean variance framework, the way to think of this is to reinterpret
the diversiﬁcation loss illustrated in ﬁgure 3 in terms of what we can call total return, the return
on both ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial assets.
If we let rfin be the return on ﬁnancial assets, and rnonfin the return on nonﬁnancial assets, such




fin + (1   !
fin)r
nonfin;
where !fin is the weight of ﬁnancial assets in the total portfolio. If we assume the investor has
mean variance preferences relative to this total portfolio, we merely have to reinterpret the port-
folios in ﬁgure 3 in terms of total return, and let rp be the return of the investor’s total portfolio,
let us call this rtot
p , and rb the return of a benchmark with the same composition of ﬁnancial and
nonﬁnancial assets, which we term rtot
b .
To analyze this portfolio we need to evaluate its expected return and variance. In addition to
the earlier characterization of the ﬁnancial portfolio which gave estimates of what we will now
term E[rfin] and var(rfin), we additionally need to specify
 !fin  the fraction of income coming from ﬁnancial assets,
 E[rnonfin]  the expected return on nonﬁnancial income,
 2(rnonfin)  the variability of nonﬁnancial income, and
 cov(rnonfin;rfin)  the covariability between ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial assets
Given estimates of these we can calculate the mean and variance of the investor’s total return as in






































































to ﬁnd estimates of some of these parameters, such as income variability, fraction ﬁnancial wealth,
and the like. While this could get us some hints as to relevant parameters, it is problematic, as such
data would need to be based on general labour data. The particular individuals we are looking at
here, which have a ﬁnancial wealth large enough to ﬁnance a position in some of the largest
companies in Norway, are likely to have a very dierent mix of ﬁnancial investments, labour
income, and income from other nonﬁnancial sources, compared to the typical individual found
from labour data. We therefore choose to go a second route, looking at the diversiﬁcation loss
parameterizing these inputs, by asking: Under reasonable parameter values for the various inputs,
how low can the total diversiﬁcation loss go? This is the question we need answered, because it
will be used as a benchmark when we discuss the beneﬁts to concentration.
4.2. How low can the total diversiﬁcation loss go?
Let us start from the ﬁnancial part of the portfolio problem. In ﬁgure 4 we have used the
estimates of the previous section to illustrate the problem for individual owners. We use the
estimated Sharpe Ratios to show the investment opportunities generated by two portfolios, the
benchmark b, proxied by an equally weighted market portfolio, and p, the estimated average
portfolio for these owners.14 At the level of standard deviation of the market portfolio p, the
diversiﬁcation loss has been estimated in the neighborhood of 13% in annual terms. What we will
do is to show the implication of this estimate for the total portfolio as we vary the other inputs to
the total diversiﬁcation loss calculation.
The most obvious factor aecting the total portfolio is the fraction of an individual’s wealth
invested in ﬁnancial assets. Let us see how the total diversiﬁcation loss varies with this. To
illustrate we need some assumptions about the nonﬁnancial part of the portfolio. We start with the
most extreme assumption, that the nonﬁnancial income is risk free, and equal to the risk free rate.
In panel A of ﬁgure 5 we show the estimated total diversiﬁcation loss as a function of the investor’s
weight in ﬁnancial assets. We see that the diversiﬁcation loss of course decreases toward zero as
the investor lowers the weight in ﬁnancial assets. However, for the individuals we consider here,
which are presumably relatively wealthy, since they can aord signiﬁcant stakes in these large
14Note that there is some discrepancy between the portfolios, the Sharpe Ratios and the earlier diversiﬁcation loss
estimates, which is due to the way the estimation is done. In estimation of diversiﬁcation loss and Sharpe ratios earlier
we used actual observation of these variables for each portfolio and then took averages. In this ﬁgure we estimate
means and standard deviations separately as input to the calculations. One can not expect exactly the same answer
based on these averages, but it is comforting to see that we get a ballpark ﬁt.


















Illustrating diversification loss estimates
* b
* p
The ﬁgure illustrates calculation of diversiﬁcation loss for the ﬁnancial portfolios of individual(family) owners. The lines are based on the estimated
Sharpe ratios, where we trace out the achievable portfolios as a function of fraction invested in the risky asset. The points p and b are plotted using
separate estimates of means and variances, which explain why they are not right on the line.
15companies, the weight on ﬁnancial assets has to be much larger than zero. It is unlikely that these
investors have more than half of their wealth linked to labour income and nonﬁnancial assets. For
an investor with 50% weight in nonﬁnancial assets the total diversiﬁcation loss is still as large as
4% in annual terms.
In generating the ﬁgure in panel A we assumed that the nonﬁnancial income was risk free, but
this is an extreme assumption unlikely to be correct. We therefore show a similar calculation with
risky nonﬁnancial income. In panel B of ﬁgure 5 we let the expected nonﬁnancial return equal
that of the ﬁnancial benchmark, but lower the variance of the nonﬁnancial income to half that of
the ﬁnancial benchmark. The ﬁgure shows the resulting relationships between total diversiﬁcation
loss and the fraction invested in ﬁnancial assets. We show separately the cases of positive, zero and
negative correlation between nonﬁnancial and ﬁnancial income. The most important observation
to make from the ﬁgure is that, with risky nonﬁnancial assets, the fraction of ﬁnancial assets in the
total portfolio must be pretty low before the total diversiﬁcation loss is pulled signiﬁcantly down
from that of the ﬁnancial portfolio, alone. For example, when the ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial assets
are uncorrelated, the total diversiﬁcation loss is only lowered to about 8:5% for an investor with
half his wealth in ﬁnancial assets. The fraction of ﬁnancial assets needs to go below a quarter of
total wealth before the total diversiﬁcation loss is halved relative to the only ﬁnancial assets case.
While the fraction ﬁnancial assets is the most important factor aecting the total diversiﬁcation
loss calculation, let us for completeness look at the sensitivity of results to the two other variables:
the return on the nonﬁnancial assets, and the volatility of the nonﬁnancial assets. Figure 6 illus-
trates the variation of the total diversiﬁcation loss as we vary these variables. In both ﬁgures we
ﬁx the weight on the ﬁnancial asset wfin at a half. We see that the diversiﬁcation loss of the total
portfolio is actually increasing in the expected return on the nonﬁnancial assets. On the other hand,
if the volatility of the nonﬁnancial asset increases, this lowers the eect of the diversiﬁcation loss
of the ﬁnancial assets on the total portfolio, although the volatility of nonﬁnancial income has to
be larger than the volatility of the stock market before the total diversiﬁcation loss is less than 6%.
The conclusion of these calculations is that the total diversiﬁcation loss is lowered by also
considering other portfolio components. But it is unlikely to be reduced to trivial values. If we
think that half of the assets in the ﬁnancial part of the portfolio is a reasonable lower bound, the
total diversiﬁcation loss is unlikely to be more than halved, i.e. go below 6% in annual terms.
4.3. Balancing the cost – private beneﬁts?
Let us now look at the question of whether the diversiﬁcation loss we estimated can be jus-
tiﬁed in terms of balancing costs with beneﬁts. We found a diversiﬁcation loss of the ﬁnancial
portfolio of about 13% annually, which will be reduced if we change the perspective to total di-
versiﬁcation loss, but is unlikely to be less than 6% for reasonable parameter values. We then
need to ask whether extant measures of private beneﬁts of control can be high enough to oset this
diversiﬁcation loss. To do so we need to ﬁnd an annualized estimate of private beneﬁts.
As mentioned, private beneﬁts of control have been measured two ways, from block premia
or voting premia. We will concentrate on the last method, as we actually have measures of these
for Norway for roughly the same period, from Ødegaard (2007b). In companies with two classes
of stock, one voting and one nonvoting, the price dierence between the two is assumed to reﬂect
the additional value of being able to control the ﬁrm through voting. Hence, the voting premium
16Figure 5: The total diversiﬁcation loss varying fraction invested in ﬁnancial assets





















Total diversification loss as a function of weight in financial assets





















Total diversification loss as a function of weight in financial assets
corr=-0.5 corr=0 corr=+0.5
The plots show the total diversiﬁcation loss (DLtot) as a functions of the investor’s weight in ﬁnancial assets. We calculate the total diversiﬁcation
loss as in equations (3) and (4). The plot in panel A is produced under the assumption that nonﬁnancial assets are risk free and have returns equal
to the risk free rate. The plot in panel B is produced under the assumption that nonﬁnancial assets are risky with expected returns equal to the
expected returns on the benchmarks, and volatility of nonﬁnancial assets equal to half of the volatility of the benchmark. In the calculations we let
E[rnonfin] = E[rb] and (rnonfin) = 1
2(rb).
17Figure 6: Changes in the total diversiﬁcation loss when varying expectation and volatility of return on nonﬁnancial
assets


















Total diversification loss as a function of expected returns for nonfinancial assets
corr=-0.5 corr=0 corr=+0.5



















Total diversification loss as a function of volatility of returns for nonfinancial assets
corr=-0.5 corr=0 corr=+0.5
The plots shows the total diversiﬁcation loss (DLtot) as a function of various parameters. We calculate the total diversiﬁcation loss as in equa-
tions (3) and (4). In the ﬁgures we ﬁx the weight on the ﬁnancial asset wfin at a half. In the plot in panel A we change the expected return on
nonﬁnancial assets (E[rnonfin]) from rf to 10% above E[r
fin
b ]. In this plot the volatility of the nonﬁnancial assets is ﬁxed at (rnonfin) = 1
2(rb).
In the plot in panel B we change the volatility of the return on nonﬁnancial assets (

rnonfin






. Here we let the the
expected return on the nonﬁnancial assets equal the ﬁnancial benchmark return, E[rnonfin] = E[rb].
18reﬂects how much an owner is willing to pay for the private beneﬁts associated with control. While
this voting premium at best is an imperfect measure of private beneﬁts,15 it is the most commonly
cited one in the literature. We therefore ask whether estimates of beneﬁts of control, found from
estimated voting premia, are large enough to oset the diversiﬁcation loss which is the focus of
this paper.
We ﬁrst have to make these two measures comparable. The voting premium reﬂects the present
value of all future private beneﬁts. Let us simplify things a bit, and assume that annual cashﬂows





where E[D] are the annual dividends, and r a required return reﬂecting the risk of the company. If












The typical estimates of voting premia (VP) are given relative to the (nonvoting) stock price. For





By plugging in the relations above and rearranging we ﬁnd the following expression for the annual







= r  0:091:
Note that this relationship depends on the (company speciﬁc) interest rate (cost of capital) r. If
we for example calculate this for a cost of capital as high as 20%, the implied return to private
beneﬁts is estimated at 1.82%. Since the returns to private beneﬁts are increasing in r, one will
have to work hard to match these estimates of private beneﬁts to the numbers for losses we found
earlier. One will need extreme levels of required return before the private beneﬁts are higher than
2% in annual terms. Given out ﬁnding that the annual total diversiﬁcation losses are unlikely to
be lower than 6%, the literature’s estimates of private beneﬁts are thus much too low to explain
15The voting premium may also be aected by other factors, such as stock liquidity and tax issues, which makes it
more dicult to isolate the voting premium. For surveys of this large literature we refer to Burkhart and Lee (2008)
and Adams and Ferreira (2008).
16In principle we could allow for discounting at a required rate of return that also reﬂects the risk of the private
beneﬁts, but we will for simplicity assume these have the same risk as the ﬁrm.
19the diversiﬁcation losses implied in our estimates.17 So, if we maintain the assumption of rational
decision making, either our estimates of diversiﬁcation losses over-estimate the true losses, or
the private beneﬁts coming from ownership concentration are larger than previously thought, or a
combination of the two is true.
5. Conclusion
In the title of the paper we mentioned two questions, the magnitude of the diversiﬁcation
costs of large, concentrated equity stakes, and whether these costs are justiﬁed. In the paper we
provide answers to both questions. We show that there, as theoretically suspected, is a large cost to
concentrated, undiversiﬁed portfolios. As far as we know, our paper is the ﬁrst to actually quantify
this cost. Let us take the example of individual owners, For the pure ﬁnancial part of such owner’s
portfolios, using mean-variance analysis we showed that an owner with the same risk as the market
portfolio could gain 13% of additional annual expected return by moving to an optimal portfolio.
While these estimated costs would be lowered if we considered the total portfolio of these owners
(a portfolio which also account for nonﬁnancial income, such as labour income), they will not be
low enough to approach the estimates of annual private beneﬁts. Thus, the answer to the second
question is “no, it is not justiﬁed.” The estimated diversiﬁcation losses are much higher than can
be explained by current estimates of private beneﬁts.
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